In this paper a mereological theory of frames of reference is presented. It shows that mereology extended by the notion of granularity and approximation is sufficient to provide a theory for location based features of frames of reference. More complex theories, taking also into account orientation and metric properties can be built as extensions of the presented theory. In order to take the hierarchical organization of frames of reference into account we introduce the notion of stratified approximation to facilitate transformations between different levels of granularity. This paper shows that the ontological grounding of the theory of frames of reference into mereology allows us to give a clear semantics to the notion 'degree of parthood' which is central to the notion of approximation. It also shows how epistemic aspects which affect the use of frames of reference help us to understand the feature of epistemic vagueness and the way it affects the notions of approximation and of degree of parthood.
, the formal theory of parthood, has not, hitherto, been held to provide a basis for theorizing about frames of reference. This is probably because the most salient features of frames of reference are characterized by ordering relations and metric properties, features which require theories much stronger than mereology for their formalization. Examples of metric frames of reference are the ones used in physics to measure distance, weight, temperature, etc. Examples of frames of reference based on ordering relations are those of cardinal directions (N,S,E, and W), the distinction between left and right relative to your body axis, clock and calendar time, etc. However it will turn out that mereology with only some extensions will be sufficient to formally describe locational frames of reference.
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for further arguments along these lines.)
Since frames of reference are often quite coarse, as in the case of the frame of reference which divides your surroundings into the part in front of you and the part behind, the specification of location of the figure within its ground (or of the referenced object within the frame of reference) is often rough or approximate. In this respect we will build upon the theory of granular partitions by
. It will turn out that the resulting formalism is quite close to the notions of rough sets w 4 T @ % ( P @ 9
and rough mereology w D F P Q )
, which are extensions of set theory and mereology developed in the context of data analysis and data mining.
One important feature of frames of reference is heir hierarchical organization. An example is the tree-like structure formed by the subdivision of London into Borroughs such as Westminster, Camden, etc at one level of granularity and parks and neighborhoods like Hyde Park, Soho, etc. at another level of granularity. Within a frame of reference based on this tree structure the relation between entities and the frame of reference, i.e., between figure and ground, can be specified at multiple levels of granularity.
Consider the sentences A 'John is in Hyde Park' B 'The Rocky Mountains are in the Western United States'. Here hierarchically ordered systems of places are used as frames of reference. As an alternative to (A) one can say, for example:
Ax John is in London. And to (B) one can say Bx The Rocky Mountains are partly located in Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. Given formal representations of the location of entities within a frame of reference it is often necessary to transform approximations between different levels of granularity. The notion of stratified approximation introduced below will facilitate these kinds of transformations.
It is important to distinguish between: (a) the study of the nature and the formal structure of frames of reference, and (b) the study of their application in certain contexts. This is because (a) refers to the study of the formal ontology of frames of reference. (b), on the other hand, refers to the question of how epistemic issues, for example issues pertaining to the limits on human knowledge and the representation of human knowledge, affect the specification of location in frames of reference and our capability to switch between levels of granularity in the ways illustrated in (A, Ax ) and (B, Bx ). From the perspective of formal ontology approximations with respect to a frame of reference are rough but crisp. Epistemic issues then give, as we shall see, raise to vagueness.
Vagueness hereby is understood in the sense that there are multiple, equally good, approximations which are consistent with the knowledge at hand. This epistemic understanding of vagueness needs to be distinguished from semantic vagueness which affects the ways names like 'Mount Everest' refer to parts of the surface of Earth f 3 6 5 8 t Q 7 R 1y T @ a 0 E R 9 A 1u v D F E Q X A
. We refer to the latter as to semantic vagueness and to the former as to epistemic vagueness. Since in this paper we exclusively focus on epistemic vagueness it will be often sufficient to use the term vagueness.
In order to provide a mereological theory that addresses the points raised above we start by extending mereology in order to take into account the feature of granularity. We then give a very general formal account of levels of granularity. In the following section we introduce the notion of approximation and show how stratified approximations can be defined across multiple levels of granularity. We then discuss epistemic issues that give raise to vagueness and extend the crisp formalism of stratified approximation in order to take epistemic vagueness into account. In the end we discuss related work and give the conclusions. The examples we use throughout the paper will be mostly spatial in nature. Due to its general nature, the underlying theory can easily be extended to domains of other sorts.
A frame of reference is a triple, . The frame of reference as a whole is formed by the three components: cell structure, target domain, projection. For an extended discussion of this specific family of frames of reference seef a A T @ P Q '
. The cell structure in part (ii) of the figure is projected onto its target domain in such a way that a particular entity (often a human being) is located at the intersection of the two diagonal lines in such a way that front, back, left and right are interpreted relative to the entity in the center in the way indicated in the picture. The frame of reference again is formed by three components: the cell structure depicted in the figure (again the maximal cell containing all cells as subcells is omitted), the target domain, and the projection of the cell structure onto the target domain. For an discussion of frames of reference of this kind see In the remainder of this section we discuss the components of frames of reference from a mereological perspective in greater detail. For this purpose we assume a sorted first order predicate calculus with identity. We distinguish variables D F 3 6 b V 0 t
. TM7 ensures that every cell has at least one atom as subcell. Finally TM8 is an axiom schema which ensures that every cell is either an atom or has finitely many subcells.
Using TM1, TM5, and TM6 we then can prove that the strong supplementation principle (SSP) holds (T1). The SSP tells us that if is not a subcell of then there exists a which is a subcell of and which does not overlap . From SSP then immediately follows the extensionallity of overlap (T2).
The extensionallity principle (T2) tells us that if that if whatever cell overlaps also overlaps then and must be identical. From this it follows that there cannot be distinct cells which coincide in the same sense in which the city of Vienna and the Austrian Federal State of Vienna coincide.
One can see that axioms TM1-TM8 constrain cell structures to be finite trees. Consequently, we have the following metatheorem: Metatheorem 1 The class of models of axioms (TM1-TM8) is identical to the class of finite trees.
is the target domain which is taken to be a partial ordering which satisfies the axioms of extensional closure mereology y 4 T R a 0 P Q )
. Based on the primitive we define the relations of proper parthood and overlap among entities in the target domain: 
In addition to reflexivity, antisymmetry, and transitivity (referred to by M1-M3) the parthood relation is characterized by the following axioms:
M4 is the strong supplementation principle. M5 and M6 ensure that binary sums exist for arbitrary entities in and that a product of two entities and exists whenever both entities overlap. M7 ensures that there exists a universe of which everything in is a part. Using M4 we can then prove that sums, products, and the universe are unique if they exist. One can also prove that summation is associative and hence it is permissible to write finite sums of the form u 9 á ¦ á Þ 5
.
As in the domain of cells we can prove that the extensionallity principle holds (T3). There might be domains in which this is too strong, dealing with such issues however requires a more elaborate theory, which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The relationship between cell structure and target domain is established by the binary relation of projection, 
Projection is then governed by the following axioms:
GM1 and GM2 ensure that From , and GM1-4 then immediately follows that and behave like inverse functions wherever is defined (T4 and T5). Using GM3, GM5, Dð , Dð , T1 we then can prove (T6) which tells us that is indeed an order homomorphism. We then prove (T7) and (T8) using T1, GM5, and T6. This tells us that both and preserve the tree structure.
Theorems T6-T8 tell us that if we are only interested in those entities in which are targeted by cells in { and mereological relations between those entities then it is sufficient to refer to the cell structure as a proxy for the more complex target domain. The advantage of talking about finite trees rather than about cell structures is that we can use a set-theoretic language and standard mathematical notation in order to talk about trees. This makes the whole formalism much simpler.
be a frame of reference with tree structure 
is a cut. We can now define levels of granularity as cuts in the tree structure. For example the levels of granularity in the tree structure in the left of Figure 2 are listed in the right part of the figure.
Using Definition 1 and (TM1-8) we can prove that the cells forming a level of granularity are pair-wise disjoint (T9) and that levels of granularity enjoy a weak form of exhaustiveness in the sense that every cell in { is either a subcell or a supercell of some cell x in the level of granularity
Definition 1 captures only certain necessary conditions that characterize levels of granularity at the most basic level: pairwise disjointness and weak exhaustiveness, two properties which are purely mereological in nature. More specific characterizations of levels of granularity may include constraints on the type of entities that form the level of granularity. For example consider a cell structure targeting a human being. One level of granularity might contain only biomolecules where another might contain only tissues or only organs. Definition 1 in its basic form admits any kind of mixture of different kinds of things to forming a level of granularity provided only that they satisfy the properties listed in definition 1. In other cases it might be useful to include also metrical notions, for example in order to require that objects forming a certain level of granularity fall into a certain range of magnitudes
. For the purpose of this paper, however, the presented definition will be sufficient.
and '
be levels of granularity in a given granularity tree. We define an ordering relation
Using TM1-3 and the extensionallity of sets we can prove that is a partial ordering using induction over the underlying tree structure:
This ordering includes at one extreme the level of granularity which consists only of the root cell as maximal element and at the other extreme the level of granularity formed by atomic (or leaf) cells as minimal element. The former is the coarsest level of granularity and the latter is the finest level of granularity. The corresponding structure is called the granularity ordering of ø . The granularity ordering now insures that, given levels of granularity 3
, then there exists a mapping
We can now distinguish two classes of levels of granularity: commulative and noncommulative. The former are levels of granularity which are such that the targets of their cells sum up to the target of the root cell. The levels of granularity in . Instead of the cell we have 'empty space' or a hole (which can be thought of as space we know nothing about).
Formally we define commulativeness as follows. Let 
Obviously, the root cell is always commulative. A frame of reference is commulative if and only if all of its levels of granularity are commulative. Otherwise it is noncommulative. For further discussion see 
We then can prove that § satisfies the following axioms of a location relation
From our definitions it immediately follows that location is a partial relation. In fact most of the entities of the target domain will not be located in the frame of reference in the way described above. This is hardly surprising since otherwise the frame of reference would be as complex as the target domain itself. It follows that we need a more general relation in order to characterize the relationship between entities in the target domain and the relevant frame of reference.
Two entities are disjoint if and only if they do not overlap (DDR). Two entities overlap partially if and only if they overlap but neither is part of the other (DRPO). Two entities are in the relation of non-symmetric overlap if and only if they overlap partially or the first is a proper part of the second.
We now can prove that, for arbitrary entities 
We call fo , po , and no approximation values and A an approximation mapping. We then can prove that coarsening with respect to a given level of granularity is unique:
Hereby we say that two mappings are identical if and only if their domains and codomains are identical and identical entities in the domain are mapped to identical entities in the co-domain. Since coarsening is unique we can define a coarsening function:
Often we consider only a fixed level of granularity. We then either write as a subscript or omit it completely (i.e., we write apprD , and min .
In Figure 5 (iii) we have
. In the remainder we omit the subscript where there is no danger of confusion.
An important feature of frames of reference is the fact that they provide means for a certain sort of abstracting or economizing information. That is, we can talk about entities in the target domain not in terms of their exact location but rather in terms of approximations. Entities with identical approximations cannot be distinguished. This significantly simplifies the structure of the target domain and facilitates approximate reasoning
Frames of reference have a hierarchical structure and therefore entities can be approximated at different levels of granularity. We saw examples in natural language in sentences A and Ax and B and Bx in the introduction and we also saw this in the example depicted in figure 5 . We now introduce the notion of stratified approximations in order to to capture these features of frames of reference formally. Let 
Approximations are crisp in the sense that within a given level of granularity for every there exists a unique approximation A (T23). For every approximation there exists a unique generalization mapping to every coarser level of granularity (T27). Moreover, it is completely clear which entities can be distinguished with respect to the underlying approximation and which are equivalent.
However frames of reference are artifacts of human cognition and their application in concrete situations is subject to limitations of human knowledge. In this section we will discuss three different sources of epistemic vagueness that arise due to different kinds of limitations of human knowledge: Epistemic vagueness hereby is understood in the sense that there are multiple, equally good, approximations which are consistent with the knowledge at hand.
When using frames of references in a concrete situation knowledge about relations between an entity targeted by the cell tree, , and an entity is typically gained by observations. Here it might be impossible to observe which of the relations holds: Notice, that in all these cases we represent knowledge, i.e., true justified beliefs, rather than mere (false) belief. n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n , and X since all entities are equivalent in the sense that they cannot be distinguished. At a finer level of granularity we might potentially be in a position to distinguish from some of the 3 since the 3 have distinct and incompatible approximations at this level of granularity.
However if all we know is the coarse approximation 
Above we have shown that given an approximation
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with respect to a mereologically commulative level of granularity 3
then there exists always a unique generalization mapping to coarser levels of granularity t with 3
. If we give up the assumption that the underlying level of granularity is commulative, then unique generalization mappings do not necessarily exist any more.
To see this consider introduce the notion of vague approximation in order to reflect this phenomenon on the formal level. It follows that this notion will be applicable to deal with the different sources of vagueness discussed in the previous section. The presented formalism is a generalization of the crisp approach discussed above. . Sometimes we will also omit the superscript. 
The notion of vague approximation allows us to define refinement from coarser to finer levels of granularity. Obviously, if all we have is knowledge about approximation at a coarse level of granularity then refinement adds vagueness in the sense defined above. Formally we define refinement as a mapping . For refinement, mereological commulativeness does not need to be considered, since it is not an additional source for vagueness. In the above we have used a mereological framework but we can interpret the target domain as a set and entities as subsets of . The difference between our approach and the rough set approach is that we start with a tree structure and levels of granularity within this tree. A level of granularity is the counterpart of the partition induced by the indiscernibility relation in the rough set approach. Sets forming levels of granularity are pairwise disjoint (T9) and exhaustive in a weak sense (T10). They are, however, not necessarily exhaustive in the strong sense in which a partition induced by an equivalence relation exhausts a set. This is because levels of granularity are not necessarily commulative. For commulative levels of granularity one can prove the equivalence of stratified (i.e., hierarchically ordered) rough sets and approximations within frames of reference
. In terms of the presented formalism one can define lower and upper approximations as follows: 
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The approach presented in this paper allows us to take into account more explicitly the nature of frames of reference, their hierarchical structure, and the epistemic issues that come up when frames of reference are applied in specific situations. In particular we discussed several sources of epistemic vagueness which can be identified within the presented. We then further extended the notion of rough sets in order to take vagueness into account. . In the remainder we refer to this approach to rough mereology as 'the data or observation driven approach'.
We now can show that the approach presented in this paper is in fact a special case of rough mereology. We define:
It follows that the presented formalism is a specific version of rough mereology. We call it the ontology driven approach to rough mereology (modulo the existence of the null-entity). Now compare the data driven and the ontology driven approach. Rough mereology was developed in the context of data analysis and is used in order to discover structures in data sets. In other words its aim is to extract conceptual (and thus to a certain degree ontological) structure from observations. Hereby no specific assumptions are made about the nature of observations, sources of epistemic vagueness, the role of frames of reference, and the role of the granular structure of the underlying domain. This has the consequence that the semantics of the domain describing the degree of parthood tends to be rather abstract and often mixes ontological and epistemic aspects. This is reflected by a criticism that has often been raised against the data driven approach, namely that the semantics of the values describing degrees of membership is often not clear. What doesRA ñ u ê mean, beyond sequences of occurrences in data sets? (A parallel criticism can be made in relation to many applications of fuzzy set theory f 4 a Q # & P 0 e .) On the approach pursued in this paper, making explicit the underlying assumptions about the nature of observations, sources of epistemic vagueness, the role of frames of reference, and the role of the granular structure of the underlying domain of entities helps to give a clear semantics for the notion 'degree of parthood'. As we have seen in (DRP1-3), it is very easy to give a specific interpretation of degrees of parthood as disjointness, non-symmetric partial overlap, and parthood. We have seen how, starting out from there one can explore in a systematic fashion the effects of such epistemic factors as limitations of observations, deficiencies of frames of reference.
As argued above, research on frames of reference has been pursued in areas like physics, linguistics, psychology, and artificial intelligence. In the context of this paper we focus on linguistic frames of reference, the figure ground distinction, and AI approaches to frames of reference.
In linguistics it is well recognized that schematization, a process that involves the systematic selection of certain aspects of a referent scene to represent the whole while disregarding the remaining aspects, plays a fundamental role in descriptions of spatial phenomena
. More specifically, schematization is characterized by a distinction between focal or primary object and reference or secondary object. This distinction is closely related to the opposition between figure and ground in Gestalt psychology
. "The figure is a moving or conceptually movable object whose site, path, or orientation is conceived as a variable the particular value of which is the salient issue. The ground is a reference object (itself having a stationary setting within a reference frame) with respect to which the figure's site, path, or orientation receives characterization."
The formalism presented in this paper reflects the distinction between figure and ground in terms of the distinction between levels of granularity (the ground) and entities (the figures) which are approximated or whose location is specified with respect to the ground. In language localizing an object (determining its location) is critical and "involves processes of dividing a space into subregions or segmenting it along its contours, so as to narrow in on an object's immediate environment."
. This corresponds exactly to the approximation (approximate location) is defined in Definition © Appr .
In the AI community there is a wide range of attempts to formalize reasoning that is supported by specific kinds of frames of reference. Consider the approach to cardinal directions by Frank f a Q T R P 0 '
, or Hernandez' cone-shaped reference frame, or Freksa'a vector based frame of reference. All are defined by a partition of space at a certain level of granularity and the localization of (point-like) entities within those regions. Each formalism gains its reasoning powers from (a) the partition structure of the frame of reference, (b) the location information of the entity or entities in the foreground, and (c) additional specific assumptions about the structure of the frame of reference such as: number of cells, shape of cells, the embedding of the cells in the plane. The assumption that the entities are non-extended points is often made to simplify the representation and reasoning.
In the presented framework we are able to deal with (a) and (b) in a general and unified fashion. Moreover the presented formalism applies to extended entities rather than to idealized points. The proposed stratifications allows us to do justice also to the hierarchical character of frames of references. The importance of exploiting hierarchical structures for reasoning purposes was was pointed out for example in how these operations can be used for reasoning purposes.
In the presented framework we do not have the resources to deal with (c) since this requires theories which are stronger than mereology. Ways of extending mereology by topological and morphological principles were discussed for example in y T @ a Q P Q )
, ® y 4 P e In this paper a mereological theory of frames of reference was presented. We showed that mereology can help us to understand the more basic features of frames of reference which are related to the distinction between figure and ground in gestalt psychology. The ground is seen as frame of reference in which the figure is located. We showed that mereology extended by the notion of granularity and approximation is sufficient to provide a theory for location based features of frames of reference. More complex theories, taking also into account orientation and metric properties of frames of reference can be built as extensions of the presented theory.
Their hierarchical organization is an important feature of frames of reference. Given approximations of entities within a frame of reference it is often necessary to transform them between different levels of granularity. We introduced the notion of stratified approximation to facilitate those kinds of transformations.
We showed that in the attempt to understand frames of reference there are two important aspects that need to be distinguished: (a) the study of the formal ontology of frames of reference, and (b) epistemic issues that arise when frames of reference are used in specific contexts.
The study of the first aspect helps to understand the the role of frames of reference and the importance of their granular structure. The ontological grounding allows us to give a clear semantics to the notion 'degree of parthood' which is central to the notion of approximation. We then showed how making explicit the nature and limitations of observations and properties of the embedding of the frame of reference into the target domain (commulativeness) help us to understand the feature of epistemic vagueness and the way it affects the notion of degree of parthood. 
